BAGHDAD, Iraq -- The Iraqi platoon slips in darkness down a path from an abandoned rail yard to a cemetery in Haifa, a Baghdad district long notorious for insurgent ambushes.

Wearing mismatched uniforms and carrying old Kalashnikov assault rifles, the soldiers step nimbly. Watching for attackers down every alley, they halt approaching cars and scan rooftops with flashlights. A beam of light sweeping over one wall reveals some unusual but welcome Arabic graffiti: "The ING is strong."

It's a reputation the soldiers of the 302nd Battalion seek to solidify in Haifa, now their turf. A former Iraqi National Guard (ING) unit that U.S. officers consider one of the most capable units in the Iraqi army, the 302nd formally took charge early this year in Haifa, part of a growing swath of central Baghdad being turned over to Iraqi forces.

The goal is to have an entire Iraqi division, about 10,000 troops, in charge of most of downtown by fall, U.S. commanders say.

"By October, we would have at least two divisions in Baghdad, one Iraqi and one U.S.," said Maj. Gen. William Webster, commander of the U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division, stationed in the capital. Some U.S. military leaders expect the gradual handover to allow a reduction of U.S. troops in Iraq beginning next year.

Street savvy pays off

Haifa offers a window on the benefits and risks of the U.S. push to shift responsibility for security to Iraqi forces.

In 15 months of street fighting here, the 1,000-man battalion has lost 26 men to assassinations, suicide bombings and block-by-block combat, a higher fatality rate than the U.S. military has suffered in all of Iraq.

But in recent weeks, attacks have fallen off sharply. Insurgents still sometimes throw grenades down alleys at the soldiers, or fire a few rounds and run. But they're attempting little else here, at least for now.

One recent night, as gunfire sounded in the distance, the Iraqi soldiers maneuvered through Haifa's dirt alleys, rutted and running with sewage. Breaking a locked gate, they entered an apartment building and escorted a sniper team out of a covert position overlooking Haifa Street, the heart of the district.

As the night wore on, the men grew lax, some smoking cigarettes and others talking on cell phones. When a tip led them to a suspected insurgent, the soldiers swarmed around him instead of maintaining their positions, a potentially dangerous lapse.

Still, what they sometimes lack in discipline, they make up for in street savvy, U.S. advisers say. Compared with U.S. troops, they can more easily spot an out-of-place bomb wire, detect nuances in dress and accent, or sense a subtle change in mood that alerts them to their enemy.

"They spotted a wire that led to a 155mm round" that U.S. forces missed, said Capt. Mark McClellan as he patrolled on the night mission. Not only do the Iraqis see telltale signs of bombs in the cluttered landscape, they often audaciously run over, grab the wires and pull them out, U.S. officers say.

Public support for the Iraqis seems to be building, judging by the number of calls and notes from residents that have led them to suspected attackers and large weapons caches. This month, a resident who had watched Iraqi soldiers hand out soccer balls the day before provided a tip that produced a huge munitions haul.

"Before, the Iraqi people hated us because they said we were just helping the Americans. But when they see us protecting Iraqi citizens, they change their mind," said the 302nd's executive officer, Col. Alaa Talib Moshin. "Now, every day I get more information on the terrorists."

As insurgents find it harder to place weapons and stage attacks in the neighborhood, they are moving out, he said. "Haifa Street is very quiet."

Capt. Edward Ballanco goes further. Ballanco is one of thousands of U.S. troops embedded in teams of 25 to 75 with Iraqi battalions to help them build staff and leadership skills and gain quick access to U.S. air and ground backup.

"They have done what our high-technology tanks, Bradleys and soldiers haven't done," he said, "and that's win the war on Haifa Street."

Old habits, fears persist

North of Haifa Street, another Iraqi army battalion, the 305th, is setting up a vehicle checkpoint. The platoon leader, Lt. Salwan Abdul Amil, sets up parallel roadblocks in a way that puts his men at direct risk from halted cars.

An American adviser, Sgt. 1st Class Joe Williams, pulls Abdul Amil aside. "You don't want all the cars stopped where your security crew is," he suggests. "You got to get a green zone to protect your guys."

Later, Williams sized up the error: "That's pretty basic. ... I'd give them probably a B."

The 305th is to take charge of a sector of Baghdad in June. Although its 920 soldiers are motivated, the checkpoint incident showed how far they have to go, U.S. and Iraqi officers say.

Even in better units such as the 302nd, old habits -- nepotism, despotic rule by officers, routine beating of captives -- survive from the days when Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq.

Iraqi soldiers also lack restraint in firing weapons, which U.S. officers consider one of the biggest dangers of working with Iraqi forces.

"Their marksmanship is horrendous," said Staff Sgt. Mark Scott of Syracuse, N.Y., a trainer with the 305th. "They'll let a whole magazine fly as soon as they come into contact. One guy shoots, and within five seconds they've all expended all their ammo. One guy looks at the other and says, 'What are we shooting at?' "

For their part, Iraqi soldiers complain that their unarmored trucks and faulty rifles leave them outgunned by insurgents. The 305th has lost dozens of soldiers and undergone 50 percent turnover since it was set up in late 2003. The Iraqi government has no logistics network to provide basic supplies, equipment, ammunition and weapons to Iraqi forces, who frequently rely on the U.S. military for such supplies.

"We are weak when we go outside," said 1st Lt. Saad Wais, 29, a 305th officer. "We don't have armored vehicles, so the explosives will kill us. And we have bad weapons. The AKs shoot 10 rounds and stop."

Many Iraqi soldiers wear sunglasses and masks while patrolling, for fear of being identified and killed later. But one recently expressed a quiet determination not to give up.

"On my flak vest, I write that there is nothing to fear except Allah," Sgt. Hashan Rahma said in a note to a reporter. "Even if it costs our life, we will fight those who bring a bad name for Islam into the world. God help us."

Behind the 302nd Battalion headquarters on Haifa Street is a 30-by-30-foot metal cage with 42 male detainees, many captured and interrogated as a result of the 302nd's aggressive raids.

Some have languished for up to two months, according to the battalion intelligence chief: "We need a bigger jail, with better security."

The overflowing holding pen is symptomatic of a lack of supervision and support from Iraq's Defense Ministry, according to U.S. military advisers and officers. As Iraqi units take charge, U.S. officers worry that the lack of civilian oversight of Iraqi security forces will allow for abuse.

"We can train all the combat units, but we can't train all the structure that keeps them under civilian control," said Col. Edward Cardon, commander of the 3rd Infantry's 4th Brigade, which is paired with the 302nd.

Iraqi forces have severely beaten some captives, U.S. officers said. "We always call them on it immediately," he said, "but if they say, 'This is our sector, back off,' we say, 'OK.' "