The great debate is on. Americans are wondering what course of action their government should pursue toward the brutal regime of Sadaam Hussein.
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| | | John Ruggiero is an associate professor of history at Saint Francis College in Loretto
jrrfa1@mail.francis.edu. He is the author of "Neville Chamberlain and British Rearmament: Pride, Prejudice, and Politics" (Greenwood, 1999). | |
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The president has linked Iraq with international terrorism as a justification for the use of force, preferably international force; unilateral force, if necessary. There are many in this country who would oppose the use of any force. Their preference would be for some diplomatic, or economic nonviolent method of dealing with Hussein -- despite the failure of economic sanctions and United Nations resolutions in the past. They argue that Iraq does not pose a clear and present danger to the United States.
As is the case in such circumstances, both sides look to history for a vindication of their position. The example most often cited is the Munich Crisis of 1938.
Munich was the culmination of many international crises in the 1930s. Moving from one crisis to the next, peace-loving nations backed down to the bullying tactics used by Japan as it violated the League of Nations charter by occupying Manchuria in 1933; by Italy as it invaded Ethiopia in 1935; and by Hitler as he systematically ripped up the Treaty of Versailles by rearming his country, annexing Austria and threatening to go to war with Czechoslovakia unless his demands toward that country were satisfied.
Desperately trying to avoid a European war, Britain's tragic prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, flew to Germany three times in order to persuade Hitler not to use force to achieve his goals. His heroic efforts were crowned with success as Czechoslovakia was sacrificed in the vain hope of preserving peace.
Hailed by peace-loving people the world over, Chamberlain proudly proclaimed "peace in our time." Yet it was the prescient warning of Winston Churchill that has proved more enduring over time. In the ensuing debate over the Munich Agreement, he told the House of Commons: "Do not suppose that this is the end. This is only the beginning of the reckoning. This . . . is the foretaste of a bitter cup which will be proffered to us year by year unless by a supreme recovery of moral health and moral vigor, we rise again and take our stand for freedom as in olden time."
Churchill, of course, was an historian and alive to the lessons of the past. One year later, his dire prediction came to pass. Chamberlain disdained his advice to rearm the country more resolutely, form alliances and stand firm against Hitler's threats. Instead he chose to continue his policy of appeasement with the dictators and the world was plunged into the most devastating war in history.
Over 50 million lives were consumed in that bloody war. With the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, that figure could easily be surpassed in today's world.
To many people, Saddam Hussein has assumed the Hitlerian position of neighborhood bully and madman.
After establishing his brutal dictatorial regime, he proved equally adept at using brutal methods to subdue his weaker enemies at home and abroad just as Hitler had done. He went to war with Iran, invaded Kuwait and fired Scud missiles into Israel. And like Hitler, who repeatedly promised after each riposte, that he had no further territorial demands to make on Europe, Saddam Hussein has flouted United Nations sanctions with smooth evasive tactics, denials and outright impudence.
And just as Hitler was able to use the financial and military resources from Austria and Czechoslovakia, and other countries, not to mention the tremendous strategic and psychological advantage he gained from his bullying tactics, Saddam Hussein presents the same problem for the world community today if he is allowed to continue in his ways.
Not only would the world economy be placed at his mercy, but Saddam would also gain ample financial resources with which to amass weapons of mass destruction. The potential for catastrophic damage, therefore, is so great that it would be imprudent for any statesman to ignore it.
That was why Saddam Hussein had to be challenged when he invaded Kuwait in 1990. This is why he must be stopped today.
To confront him at a later date, after he has amassed his WMD, may be too late. One can only shudder at the thought of Saddam gaining control of Kuwait's economic resources and establishing hegemony in the region. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and all the Gulf states would then have had to come to terms with Iraq, producing a huge domino effect throughout the Islamic world.
There are many lessons to be learned from Munich, to be sure.
The recognition that nations must never allow their defenses to lag behind the bully nations, to prevent them from being blackmailed.
The importance of building strong and dependable alliances with other countries. International organizations, like the United Nations, are too unwieldy. Just like its predecessor, the League of Nations, such bodies have been proven ill-equipped to deal with the great powers because of their many conflicting political and economic interests. Thus, France and Russia continue to hamstring our efforts to deal with the Iraqui problem fro their own selfish reasons
And finally, and most important of all, a nation must be psychologically prepared to use the resources at its disposal, and not succumb to what Alexandr Solzhenitsyn has described as "the spirit of Munich." In his Nobel Prize lecture in 1972, he warned that:
"The spirit of Munich is not a thing of the past . . . I would venture to say that the spirit of Munich is predominant in the 20th century. The entire civilized world trembled, a snarling barbarism suddenly re-emerged and moved into the attack [and] it had nothing to fight with but smiles and concessions. The spirit of Munich is the illness of the will-power . . . of those who have given in to the desire for well-being at any price. . . . Such people, and there are many of them in the world today, choose to be passive and retreat, just so their normal lives may last a little longer, just so the move to austerity may not happen today. And for tomorrow, it will be all right, you'll see . . ."
We, of course, will never know what would have happened if the Allies had stood up to Hitler. There is considerable evidence to suggest that it might have been better to have confronted Hitler at Munich. Although he was stronger in the air, he was not prepared for a European war, as his generals were well aware.
There was even serious thought given to overthrow him in a coup if the British had given the plotters encouragement to do so. Munich allowed Hitler to eliminate a second front and acquire all of Czechoslovakia's military stores without exhausting his own, thereby making him a much more formidable foe a year later when he invaded Poland.
The "spirit of Munich" also required that the Allies not form alliances against Germany for fear of antagonizing Hitler. At any rate, the results could not have been more disastrous for the West than it suffered at Munich.
Such are the lessons of Munich. To those voices who complain of unilateralism, they must remember that it was the failure of Great Britain and France to lead the League of Nations against the aggressor states that failed to prevent World War II.
And now that the United States is trying to provide that leadership, we are called arrogant. To those who would require a "smoking gun" before taking action, remember, smoke only occurs after the gun has gone off.
It may be too late, as it was with Hitler. And to those who despair of the cost in human life, let them remember World War II and the Holocaust. And finally, remember that "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."
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